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Disclaiming the Diaspora: 
Somali Forced Migrants in Cairo 
and “the Other Abroad”
Faduma Abukar Mursal1
“Of course I am not [among the diaspora]! Look at me, I am still 
in Africa!” (Hassan, refugee in Cairo, interview 09.02.2013)
I. Introduction
The concept of diaspora has attracted much attention in the scholarly 
debate on migration, and has also entered into public discourse, even 
being appropriated by migrants themselves.2 For instance, the term 
diasborada is now part of the Somali vocabulary, referring not only to 
a named phenomenon integral to Somali realities but to a particular 
group of people. It refers specifically to Somali migrants who have 
mobilized themselves as a political formation under the label “dias-
pora” to negotiate their role as agents of social change.3 Further, claims 
of Somali migrants have gained recognition in Somalia, where people 
apply this social category to them.4 This process of claimmaking and 
recognition of the diaspora is pervaded with a seemingly universalist 
discourse which addresses all migrants outside a “homeland.”5 Yet, 
naming and claimmaking processes are situated within power rela-
tions, which involve ways of silencing some migrants and making 
them invisible and which, therefore, require careful attention.6 The 
statement quoted above, made by Hassan, a Somali refugee who has 
been living in Cairo for the last few years, is an example of voice who 
resist the discourse of “diaspora.” Although Hassan lives outside of 
Somalia, he denies being a member of the so-called diaspora, a term 
that he associates more specifically with Somali migrants living in the 
global North, that is, in “the other abroad.” Drawing on four months 
of ethnographic fieldwork among Somali forced migrants in Cairo in 
2013, this paper illustrates one way in which the term of diaspora is 
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used by forced migrants and analyzes the meaning it takes in a par-
ticular setting.
The next section presents briefly ways in which the concept of dias-
pora has been framed in scholarly discussions, emphasizing the recent 
trend of conceptualizing the diaspora as a political project. In line with 
Kleist’s (2008a) suggestion that diaspora is a “concept of a political 
nature that might be at once claimed by and attributed to different groups 
and subjects” (2008a:307, emphasis in original), this paper explores the 
construction of the category of diaspora from the perspective of forced 
migrants. Following that, a brief history of Somali migration to Egypt 
is provided as a backdrop for presenting varying profiles of Somali 
migrants living in Cairo today. In this old and densely populated city, 
the figure of the forced migrant is constructed as the opposite of the 
“Somali Westerner”7—that is, the Somali who has acquired citizenship 
in a western country. The third section of the paper shows how Somali 
forced migrants in Cairo earns a living and which solidarity networks 
they are part of. This will help to explain why Somali forced migrants 
contrast the precarious conditions of their lives with those of Somali 
Westerners. The last section explores the ways in which my informants 
in Cairo, in their everyday practices and encounters with Somali West-
erners, refuse to apply the term “diaspora” to themselves. Indeed, the 
informants established a distinction between them as Somali forced 
migrants and the diaspora, that are Somali Westerners who are asso-
ciated with mobility, economic, and social agency. Disavowing any 
connection to the category of diaspora allows them to exclude them-
selves from public discourse mobilizing the “diaspora” as part of the 
country’s economic development. Moreover, this distinction allows 
them to address the Somali state and present themselves as particular 
group of citizens who have particular needs, for example the improve-
ment of life conditions in Egypt and the negotiation of the conditions 
for return.
II. The Diaspora: From Sociological Fact to Political Project
This section provides a brief overview of the ways in which the con-
cept of diaspora has been conceptualized. While it is used to describe 
broadening groups of migrants, more recently, it has often been used 
to refer to a particular project.
Historically, the term diaspora referred to classic cases of the “victim 
diaspora,” as in the cases of the Jews, Armenians, and Greeks among 
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others.8 Since the turn of the twenty-first century, the term has been 
extended to national, ethnic, and religious groups which dispersed 
spatially over long periods of time and which engage in particular rela-
tionships linking their host country and homeland. The Somali setting 
provides a compelling example of the use of diaspora as a descriptive 
frame. Somalia has a long history of migration which was intensified 
due to recurring drought and the conflict of the late 1980s, which, 
taken together, led over two million people to emigrate. Studies on 
Somali migrants situate the latter in ambiguous relationships between 
host and homeland. On the one hand, Somali migrants are addressed 
within debates over local integration in the host society.9 On the other 
hand, Somali migrants are described as a group bounded to strong 
ideas and practices of an (imagined) homeland to which they pro-
fess their loyalties through remittance practices,10 marriage practices 
and transnational family structures,11 healing practices,12 and political 
engagement.13 As such, because of the significant number of Somali 
people living outside of Somalia over a long period of time with these 
particular relationship to the host and home countries, it has been 
commonplace to refer to them as the “Somali diaspora.”
As a response to the hybrid and heterogeneous character of dias-
poras, the meaning of the term diaspora has expanded since its early 
conception in scholarly discussions.14 Indeed, the concept has been 
appropriated in public and popular discourse, and refers to any group 
of spatially displaced migrants, that include ethnic and/or religious 
minorities, immigrants, or expatriates to name only a few. Efforts to 
understand refugees’ lived realities in contemporary migration sug-
gest the use the theoretical frame of “diaspora.”15 In this context, refu-
gees are increasingly described as agents of social change, especially 
with regard to their impact in terms of remittances,16 leaving space to 
discuss whether there is “refugee diaspora” or there are “refugees in 
diaspora.”17
In spite of the “dispersal” of the diaspora, which is without a clear 
definition, core constituting elements are identified. Vertovec (1997) 
sums up the conceptualization of diaspora in three forms: namely the 
“diaspora as social form,” “diaspora as a type of consciousness,” and 
“diaspora as a model of cultural production.” The first refers to a dis-
tinct group with various social, political, and economic relationships 
across national boundaries;18 the second indicates a kind of awareness 
of belonging and connectedness;19 the third involves the production 
and reproduction of transnational social and cultural phenomena.20 
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These three forms correspond to what Brubaker (2005) has identified 
more generally as three core elements: a spatial dispersion generally 
across state border, the orientation towards a (imaginary) homeland, 
and lastly boundary maintenance, a process that involves the mobiliza-
tion of group solidarity over time.21 Despite the worries about the loss 
of analytical and descriptive potential of the concept of diaspora, it 
remains a tool which provides some analytical value to understand the 
ways in which overseas identities are constructed.22
In the latest stage of diaspora thinking, a discursive approach 
emerges as critical to the essentialist notion of identity and ethnicity 
on which it is based.23 Therefore, this approach suggests to use the 
category of “diaspora” as an emic notion, in order to identify who 
talks about the diaspora and illustrates what it means to talk about it 
in the way it is done. Indeed, Brubaker (2005) suggests considering the 
diaspora “not in substantialist terms as a bounded entity, but rather 
as an idiom, a stance, a claim. We should think of diaspora in the first 
instance as a category of practice, and only then ask whether, and how, 
it can fruitfully be used as a category of analysis.”24 As such, the dias-
pora becomes a claim and “complex of practices,” a particular project 
with political connotation instead of an objective reality. In this sense, 
the diaspora does not refer to a “fixed identity,” but remains useful as 
a concept of identity formation, struggle for recognition and claims-
making process.25
In this article, in line with Kleist (2008a,b, 2013) and Horst (2013), I 
explore one effect of diaspora labeling, rather than assessing what con-
stitutes diaspora as a sociological entity. This enables us to shed new 
light on the growing debate about the use of the notion of diaspora to 
explain and describe groups of refugees.26 Kleist (2008a) illustrates the 
mobilizing potential of the term diaspora and the advantage of mobi-
lizing “in the name of the diaspora,” which has a powerful universalist 
claim—that is speaking for all Somalis outside Somalia, for instance. 
In relation to Somali migrants, she illustrates the ways in which par-
ticular Somali migrants (i.e., Somali migrants in the “West”) formulate 
particular claims “in the name of the diaspora,” thereby appropriating 
the category of diaspora.27 Moreover, Horst (2013) illustrates well the 
depoliticizing effect of “diaspora” when applied to refugee communi-
ties, who have to comply with donor expectations. Horst (2013) notes 
that, in fact, not all individuals claim to be of the diaspora, rather: 
“[t]he individuals that are included in the seemingly all-encompass-
ing ‘diaspora’ concept are generally those who have the resources and 
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willingness to engage transnationally. The concept occludes obvious 
class differences and is in practice attributed to and claimed by a cer-
tain, by and large elite, segment of Somali, Ethiopian and Eritrean 
communities in Europe.”28 This paper illustrates the ways in which 
forced migrants resist the all-encompassing character of diaspora, by 
disclaiming it, and thereby creating a space to formulate their demands 
and political claims.
III. Somali Forced Migrants in Egypt
Egypt has traditionally been perceived as a crossroad to the global 
North because of its strategic geographic position and its official open 
migration policy.29 The inflow of migrants into Egypt has increased 
since the 1990s, following the outbreak of conflicts in Sudan, Somalia, 
and elsewhere. Waves of asylum seekers and refugees have steadily 
increased into Cairo especially, which in 2012 hosted one of the larg-
est urban refugee populations with more than 100,000 refugees regis-
tered at UNHCR-Egypt. This section focuses on the Somali migrants 
to Cairo, with a particular emphasis on the reason why they arrive in 
Cairo, and their characteristics. This will allow us to understand the 
distinction between the categories of the forced migrant and that of the 
Somali Westerner.
Somali migration to Cairo has evolved since 1970, when it involved 
mostly educated Somali such as diplomat families, students on gov-
ernment scholarship, and workers in the Persian Gulf attracted by 
the country because of its prestige as a cultural and religious center 
in the Arab world, and particularly because of its educational system. 
Since the outbreak of the Somali Civil War and the collapse of Siyad 
Barre’s regime in the early 1990s, the inflow of Somali forced migrants 
has evolved on par with the development of the conflict over the last 
decades. This latest wave of forced migrants comprised a population 
with a generally lower educational background and fewer social and 
economic resources,30 and to whom Egypt is considered as a “tran-
sit” country, namely a pivotal space at the crossroad to the so-called 
West. This conception has been facilitated by the Egyptian govern-
ment’s official open policy, and by the establishment of UNHCR in 
1954, which contributed to Cairo gaining the reputation of having the 
world’s largest administration for resettling refugees in third coun-
tries.31 In particular, the geographical proximity, the relative security 
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and the establishment of the UNHCR are the main reasons why Somali 
migrants decide to move to Cairo.
In this analysis, the “refugee” or the “forced migrant” is used as an 
emic notion that is from the localized point of view of Somali forced 
migrants living in Cairo. The notion of refugee, and the legal status 
associated with it, is commonly defined in the different Conventions 
regulating displacement in the context of a discourse of human rights 
as a person fleeing a country because of state persecution. From an 
individual perspective, however, it is meaningless to distinguish the 
causes that undermined fundamental human dignity and necessitated 
leaving, be they comprised of one or of many sources producing inse-
curity and socio-economic or environmental concerns. And often, these 
reasons overlap.
Consider the case of Maryan Saalix who is around twenty-five years 
old. Maryan left Somalia with her family at an early age to emigrate 
illegally the Saudi Arabia where she stayed a little less than ten years. 
There, despite the extreme vulnerability in which they lived—includ-
ing lack of legal status; basic social services; access to education or 
employment; and constant insecurity—she and her family earned a 
little money by cooking Somali food and selling it during birthdays 
and weddings. She rarely went outside her house because of fear of 
being deported. Nonetheless, she, her four sisters, three brothers and 
her mother were deported to Somalia after a “neighborhood cleaning” 
action, which is a hunt for migrants without legal status in a particular 
neighborhood. They stayed in Somalia for two months, where she did 
not leave her house out of fear for her personal security. After one of 
her brothers was killed by warring Al-Shabaab group in Somalia in 
2011, she and her family decided to sell their house and go to Cairo 
where they have since been waiting to be resettled.
The story of Maryan illustrates how migrants engage in decision-
making processes which are nonetheless dependent on security con-
cerns and institutional responses.32 Displacement to Egypt is neither 
linear nor direct, rather forced migrants have multiple experiences 
abroad, in this case Saudi Arabia, but Cairo emigrants arrive also via 
Libya, Tanzania, or Ethiopia. The relative safety of Cairo and the low 
risk of deportation compared to other countries such as Saudi Arabia 
are of central relevance, as is UNHCR-Egypt’s reputation as a reset-
tling institution. Although the inflow of Somali migration in Cairo 
has been steady, it has been intensified after the Ethiopian interven-
tion beginning in 2006, reaching a peak of 7,400 registered refugees 
in 2012 which kept on increasing.33 These numbers should be revised 
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upwards, considering cases not included in UNHCR records, because 
people have been rejected, or have not registered, or are counted as 
students.
For instance, Maxamed earned a living in Mogadishu by teaching 
there when his professor left for the Persian Gulf. At the age of eigh-
teen, he applied for a scholarship to study in Cairo after his brother 
was killed by members of the Islamic Courts in Somalia in 2005:
“We went to them, the boy who killed him was arrested, he said ‘it [the 
bullet] slipped that’s all. We didn’t want to kill him; we were joking 
around and bab! He died.’ So he [the brother] died because of jokes. It is 
difficult for me to understand Somalia. I should study; here [in Soma-
lia] there is only [the rule of] gun and clan.” [Maxamed, interview on 
01.04.2013]
Studying abroad has been a strategy to get away from Mogadishu and 
the insanity of the conflict. It also offers alternative access to educa-
tion. In Mogadishu, studying is expensive (approximatively $120 per 
month), and being student may even be exposing as someone with 
economic resources. In comparison, education in Cairo is free at the 
university Al-Azhar, and there is the possibility for a Muslim student 
to receive a scholarship.
Indeed, besides seeking protection in Cairo, the educational oppor-
tunities available to Somali students, same as other Muslim students, 
is an additional advantage. The old prestigious Islamic university Al-
Azhar has attracted a number of African Muslim students.34 Originally 
an instrument of Nasser policy to enforce a pan-Islamic ideology, the 
institution diffuses secular knowledge in the Muslim worlds.35 In the 
1980s, being a student at Al-Azhar used to be prestigious and used to 
provide students with a career as an Arabic and/or Koranic teacher in 
the country of origin. Nowadays, however, these students tend to look 
like economic migrants due to the limited opportunities the degrees 
now provide. Rather, the status of students at Al-Azhar and the asso-
ciated meager scholarship (between $14 and $25 per month) enable 
students to stay in Cairo for a long time on the condition of having a 
valid registration.36 There is only a thin line between Somali students 
and Somali refugees, because the student visa is a safe way to come to 
Cairo, is used as a legal means to live there, and the stay is maintained 
through the renewal of the registration at the university, while register-
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ing at the UNHCR after completing the undergraduate program is an 
option.37
Despite the heterogeneous character of this wave of Somali forced 
migrants in Cairo, they all define themselves as qaxooti, which liter-
ally means refugee but is used more specifically for forced migrants.38 
Indeed, they can be distinguished due to their legal status in Cairo 
as refugees or students among others, on the basis of their being dis-
placed, the time-span they have been living outside Somalia, or their 
previous experiences in other settings. In fact, the category of “forced 
migrant” is increasingly used as the antithesis of the emerging figure 
of the “Somali Westerners.”39
Indeed, Al-Sharmani (2006) has written on what she has called the 
Somali “émigrés” in reference to people of Somali origins who have 
acquired a citizenship in the “West,” and who began to settle in Cairo 
in about 2000. This includes approximately 200 families, which have 
moved to Cairo because they felt socially and economically margin-
alized in the global North.40 For those seeking security and access to 
education, Cairo is perceived as an appropriate alternative, in addition 
to the perception that moral and religious values are similar to Somali 
ones.41 At the same time, in contrast to the country of nationality in 
the global North, establishing oneself in Cairo is experienced as social 
and economic empowerment. Life in Cairo is cheaper in many regards, 
which allows them, for instance, to send their children to a private 
school, which would not have been possible in their country of nation-
ality.
Therefore, the category of the “forced migrant” is defined in a pro-
cess that others the Somali Westerner (i.e., the “diaspora”). As such, the 
informants defined themselves as a group bounded to similar vulnera-
ble life conditions that differ from those of Somali westerners in Cairo, 
as this will be elaborated in the next section.
A. Forced Migrants’ Livelihood and Networks in Cairo
This section illustrates the ways in which the livelihood of forced 
migrants leads to a specific subjectivity, that of the qaxooti. As men-
tioned earlier, Cairo is a place in which different types of Somali 
migrants live together. This section describes various facets of the live-
lihood of Somali refugees living in Cairo and the networks they estab-
lish to cope with their social and economic vulnerability. It illustrates 
the ways in which both types of Somali migrants share particular rela-
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tionship by considering themselves Somalis, and are part of similar 
social networks. This will explain reasons how forced migrants con-
struct the figure of the Somali Westerner as the other, based on their 
unequal access to political, economic, and social resources.
The government policy towards migrants and refugees remains of 
central importance to understanding the livelihood of forced migrants 
in the capital. Egypt is a signatory of the Geneva Convention of 1951 
relating to refugees’ status, the Protocol of 1967 and the African 
Union Convention of Addis-Abeba of 1969. These sets of agreements 
illustrate why Egypt has traditionally been seen as having an open 
migration policy.42 The UNHCR-Egypt has been delegated the task of 
overseeing refugee status since 1954, and provides refugees with basic 
social services and legal protection. Somali forced migrants, who have 
been granted the status of refugees, receive little protection from the 
UNHCR-Egypt. However, the growing number of refugees, the ten-
sion with the Egyptian government and restrictions in third countries’ 
policies contributed to undermine the capacity of the UNHCR-Egypt 
to provide these basic social services. For instance, informants stress 
the limited impact of the institution, and its slow response to their 
basic needs. They thus claim that it is maintaining a status quo in which 
one “neither dies, nor lives.”43
In spite of Egypt’s official open policy, the legal framework in fact 
increases refugees’ vulnerabilities in Cairo, presenting them with 
numerous challenges in meeting their basic needs. Indeed, because of 
reservations in several key articles in access to education, employment 
among others and the poor implementation of international conven-
tions, the Egyptian government explicitly considers refugees and asy-
lum seekers as a temporary presence.44 For example, housing and rent 
are central challenge, particularly in densely populated urban settings 
like Cairo. The rent burden is of particular concern for forced migrants, 
because rent protection laws do not apply to foreigners, including ref-
ugees.45 They face steady escalation of rents since the Egyptian reform 
of the rent system in 2005, which allows landlords to increase the rent 
by 10% every year.46 For forced migrants, this constitutes a steady 
increase in rent burden and involves ongoing changes of housing. 
Faadumo Xusseen, in her late sixties, has lived in one apartment with 
her daughter and her son’s two sons since last year. Her daughter is 
the main one responsible for the family, while her son who lives in the 
UK is their provider. While the children go to a school organized by a 
Somali association in the area, the family’s main problem remains the 
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increase in rent burden-which has been increased by 20% although she 
lives in a peripheral popular neighborhood:
“Life in Cairo used to be good, but now it’s getting expensive, the rent is 
out of reach and houses are expensive. First of all, since we came here, 
we didn’t experience insecurity, thank God. But rent is always getting 
more expensive. You are always being asked for more money. Every 
month, if you stay a year, you have to pay more. It used to be 1000 [ap. 
$140] Egyptian pounds when we came, now it’s 1200 [ap. $170].” [Faad-
umo Xusseen, interview 07. 03. 2013]
Besides the increase in rent, Somali forced migrants have voiced their 
fear of the landlord and the consequent precariousness in housing. 
Similar accounts can be found among other groups of forced migrants 
in Cairo.47
The economic and social vulnerability of forced migrants has 
increased with regard to the growing security concerns following the 
uprisings of 2011. The youth-driven Egyptian revolution contributed 
to rising insecurity, exposing forced migrants to various attacks, theft, 
abduction and rape.48 Moreover, refugees are excluded from the labor 
market. The informal sector, especially domestic work which is not 
considered labor, remains the main sector of employment. Although 
even a majority of Egyptians work in the informal sector, employment 
opportunities for forced migrants remain even scarcer because of the 
legal interdiction to access the employment market and the lack of 
protection against exploitation.49 Forced migrants, including graduate 
students, are paid a third or less of what Egyptians earn for the same 
job, if they are paid at all. A case in point is the story of Mustafa who is 
twenty-five years old. He used to be a student who was sent to Egypt 
by his parents. Shortly after he arrived in Cairo, his family fled Somalia 
after the Ethiopian intervention in late 2006. No longer funded by his 
father, Mustafa then had to partly support his family who had fled to 
Ethiopia. At the end of his studies at Al-Azhar, he started working for 
an Egyptian agency that was targeting Somali Westerners as clients. 
The pressure to have a job is strong in order to contribute to sending 
money to his family, and any employment opportunity is good, even if 
it is much less than the standards for Egyptians.
“This man [his employer] may God reward him, he is doing me a favor. 
If I get 30% of the salary of an Egyptian doing exactly the same job as me, 
he is doing me a favor. There are some people you work for and after 
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six months they tell you “Go away! You are not getting anything!” What 
can you do? I mean to whom are you going to complain? If you say I am 
going to go to report them to the [Egyptian] state, you are going to be 
arrested!” [Mustafa, interview 26.03.2013, Cairo.]
While Cairo is expected to be a temporary crossroad, it turns into 
a dead-end where migrants remain for an indeterminate time-span. 
More and more refugees under the UNHCR-Egypt’s protection are 
increasingly ineligible to be resettled in spite of their refugee status. 
One especially important reason is that their number exceeds the quo-
tas specified in the migration policy of receiving countries. The numer-
ous vulnerabilities listed above are characteristic and widespread 
among urban forced migrants in general.50
Yet, while Somali forced migrants are registered at the UNHCR, 
with or without protection, they need to get by in Cairo. As a result, 
they develop strategies to cope with their living conditions. One is 
the creation of solidarity practices among forced migrants. The shared 
vulnerable social condition creates a feeling of belonging. Sharing the 
rent burden is a common practice: students share apartments, but also 
more generally single Somalis share flats. For example, Warda no lon-
ger has close relatives in Cairo nor in Somalia. She lives with close 
friends whom she met in Cairo at the community school she now goes 
to ‘Aashir, one of the two largest Somali populated neighborhoods. She 
considers them to be qaraabo—that is, distant relatives as well as people 
who become close friends.
The clan-based networks are reinvented in an insecure environment 
in order to remake solidarity networks. The role of “clan” and kinship 
affiliation has been widely debated in Somali society, especially in rela-
tion to Somali political history.51 In relation to migration, they appear 
as local and transnational networks reproduced as powerful structures 
of identification. In Cairo, clan relations pervade networks in which 
Somali migrants are embedded, thus influencing for example the deci-
sion to move to Cairo, but also providing better access to Somali West-
erners living in Cairo.52 Another mechanism requires each member 
of a particular sub-clan to contribute a certain amount of money at 
the end of the month. This provides a powerful means to deal with 
sudden events that require large sums of money, necessary in case of 
severe health problems or death for instance. Yet, the reproduction of 
clan-based structures and related institutions is attenuated while liv-
ing abroad. In other words, Somali migrants rework these structures to 
gain certain advantages while rejecting more compelling aspects:
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“The other day in Cairo, they said in the “community” [association, 
organization]: “we want 4.5.”53 Why do I want 4.5 when I have left it? 
Then comes clan Right and clan Wrong in those places. I choose Far-
tuun.54 If we can talk to each other, if we understand each other, if you 
can talk for us, Fartuun then I work with you. But I don’t want clan Right 
and clan Wrong. I am here in Egypt, region here and there and clan here 
and there, I left it back there.” [Axmed, interview on 22.03.13, Cairo]
What Axmed evokes here is a discussion he had with other members 
of an association active in Cairo. The issue is about establishing the 
4.5 formula in the management of the association, that is, a represen-
tation of different sub-clan in relation to their respective numerical 
strength, as it has been done in the former Somali Transitional Federal 
government. Axmed voiced strong opposition to it—as he claims he 
left political representation of belonging to particular regions (such as 
Somaliland and Puntland, among other) or to particular clan in Soma-
lia. In Cairo, he chooses someone on individual basis, someone with 
whom he can communicate and can relate to. What this illustrates is 
that being abroad enables them to renegotiate the role “clan” plays in 
organizing themselves. Although Axmed showed clear opposition to 
“clanism” in general, he remains attached to what he called Somali cul-
ture, particularly to the deliberative institutions, the xeer, as he himself 
is an “elder” in his neighborhood. As he explained the cases he deals 
with, it seems that his role is not so much mediator between members 
of different clans but rather limited to an esteemed elder who tries to 
find compromises in minor conflicts emerging from poverty in Cairo 
(e.g., between two young boys who fought over a mobile phone). His 
priority is that Somalis deal with their own problems and are not seen 
as troublemakers by their Egyptian neighbors.
Furthermore, Axmed and other Somali forced migrants are orga-
nized in several organizations, mainly called “communities.” The 
organization Somali Association For Women and Children (SAFWAC) 
is partly funded by the UNHCR and by money collected from the 
émigrés, and to a lesser extent other forced migrants. The association 
provides English, Arabic, and Koranic classes for women and children 
in Cairo, but also training in hair dressing, make-up, mathematics, 
and computer science among other activities. Moreover, SAFWAC is a 
space for Somali women and children to gather, regardless of their age 
or their social status. It provides students with employment opportuni-
ties, and space in which they can meet each other. Such organizations, 
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mosques, but also houses and bars, are common places where Soma-
lis from different sub-clans, of different legal status, and generation 
spend time playing cards and discussing everyday life experiences. 
Some forced migrants have oft noted in this regard that “if Somalis in 
Somalia behaved the same as Somalis treat each other in Cairo, there 
wouldn’t be a war.” This speaks more generally to a social link and 
feeling of belonging which is marked by everyday experiences in the 
city and a shared legal and social exclusion from Egyptian society.
The Somali “diaspora,” which refers to the Somali émigrés from 
Somali forced migrants point of view, form strong social ties within the 
solidarity networks, distinguishing them from other forced migrants—
who are considered “uncovered,”55 meaning vulnerable. Somali émi-
grés, and more generally Somali migrants worldwide, represent a 
social capital for Somali forced migrants in Cairo. In this vein, the role 
of remittances has been widely explored as an important transnational 
practice.56 Most forced migrants have relatives or friends who live in 
western countries and who give either incidental or regular financial 
support—varying from fifty to one-hundred dollars a month.
Moreover, Somali Westerners living in Cairo provide employment 
opportunities, which sometimes represent the only income for Somali 
forced migrants. Indeed, all of the informants had a job in the informal 
market, principally providing services to Somalis “émigrés” as nan-
nies, teachers, or petty trade activities among others. The economic 
conditions of many forced migrants have changed after the revolution, 
because they are dependent on émigrés. Axmed’s situation changed 
after the Egyptian revolution of 2011. Before the revolution, he earned 
a modest income by doing the shopping and bringing the children to 
school for an émigrés family, who had left England and the USA to 
settle in Cairo.
“When the revolution happened [in Egypt in 2011], people from the 
diaspora returned because the security of the country decreased. Before, 
they used to have some money, they could walk [in the city] as they 
pleased, they would go to their home and take care of their children. But 
since the revolution started, they were beaten up, they were attacked, 
and they lost what they had. I was depending on them. I used to provide 
them with some services, work for them. I would earn a little from that. 
But since they left, I became jobless. Because the people I was working 
for left.” [Axmed, interview on 22.03.13, Cairo]
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Moreover, another dimension of relationships can be found in mar-
riage arrangement. In Cairo, the politics of marriage brings together 
converging interests. Those in the global South seek partners in the 
global North primarily for economic protection, while men in the 
global North seek women in the global South because they are con-
sidered to be more family-oriented.57 For instance, Aliya became the 
second wife of a Somali man living in England and is now mother to 
a little boy. Her husband lives with his first wife in England and visits 
her and their child regularly. Aliya chose her marriage as an economic 
strategy. She does not live in economic insecurity because she has an 
apartment where she can live with her son. She is not worried about 
his future and she experiences the absence of the husband as freedom 
because she does not have to cook for him, for instance, and can spend 
time with her friends. Of course, transnational marriage is not only 
based on converging material interests,58 but here it illustrates another 
network in which both émigré and forced migrants partake.
III. Other But The Same: 
The Passport and Disclaiming The Category of Diaspora
The previous section has emphasized the relationships and worldwide 
networks in which Somali forced migrants in Cairo are embedded, and 
in which the relations with the Somali émigrés are important social 
capital. They share a common sense of belonging through the idea of 
Somalia as a common homeland. This facilitates relationships based on 
converging material interests: forced migrants provide émigrés with 
their services, be they domestic work or teaching, while the émigrés 
provide financial resources in return. In the following, I illustrate the 
ways in which forced migrants, by contrasting their lives to the émigré 
population, distance themselves from the “diaspora” and its associ-
ated political, economic, and social resources. Mainly, the distancing 
revolves around the notion of the passport, which is associated as 
much with political relevance, as with economic resources or social sta-
tus. Further, forced migrants reject the use of “diaspora” as a relevant 
category for themselves in order to exclude themselves from public 
discourse mobilizing the “diaspora.”
The greatest difference centers on the acquisition of a citizenship 
other than the Somali one. It is surely not astonishing that the passport, 
as the materialization of citizenship, comes out so strongly in forced 
migrants’ accounts. States efforts to regulate people’s movements have 
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historically been explained through the invention and elaboration of 
the passport as part of the nation-state building project, which is ulti-
mately an instrument to distinguish citizens from non-citizens.59 Even 
Somalia, which is considered a typical case study of a failed state, 
issues passports. Yet, despite the document, Somali forced migrants 
consider themselves stateless:
“Now you come to Egypt as a refugee, who knows about you? Do you 
know? No. So you don’t have rights. But everyone has rights in their 
home, among their people, with their state. There you are someone. But 
if you come outside and you are a refugee, and that you do not have a 
state, no one can tell if you are living or dead.” [Axmed, interview on 
22.03.13, Cairo]
So while informants have a Somali passport, they consider themselves 
“without state” as Axmed revealed. In fact, the passport they are seek-
ing is one that has political relevance. Different passports are asso-
ciated with different values: the “honorable” or the “big” passport 
(baasaboorka sharaf leh or wey-weyn) refers to those issued by Western 
countries, while the Somali one is a weak one.
Although it has been widely acknowledge over the last two decades 
that Somalia is a failed state, the state remains the main referent and 
legitimate authority ratifying conventions regulating migration issues.60 
Thus, Somali forced migrants are not stateless on paper, rather, they 
are forcibly bounded to the Somali political community—and have an 
ambiguous status. Somali forced migrants expressed a strong feeling 
of having no safety net and no backing. Maxamud’s example illustrates 
this status of falling outside the conventional citizen characteristic that 
is common for forced migrants. In their situation, deportation itself 
tragically becomes a luxury.
“I was among those who were caught. [silence] During these ten months 
I was in jail, we were at first twenty-five, and then up to 500 Somalis. 
Other people were from Pakistan, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt; people like 
this. People like this joined us, but they were deported. They were sent 
back to their countries. We were told: ‘you are Somali, there is no plane 
going to Somalia because of insecurity.’ So we stayed there [in prison] 
for ten months. We couldn’t be deported, neither could we be released. 
‘There is no state in Somalia, we can’t bring you there and if we release 
you, you are going to go back into the sea and die there. So, you stay in 
jail, that’s better’ ” [Maxamud, interview 14.03.2013, Cairo]
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For forced migrants, acquiring a passport represents the final step of 
leaving “refugeehood” and it remains central in distinguishing forced 
migrants from Somali Westerners.
“People living in Africa or in Arab countries, and those in Europe, to be 
honest there is a great difference. People living abroad, in Europe, or in 
the United States of America, Australia, or Canada, they are different. 
They have good lives. They have passports. The reason why people run, 
the most important thing is the passport. People staying in Africa, they 
came because they want to go to those places. People here [in Cairo], 
when you closely look at it, 70% or 80% want, be they students or refu-
gees or whatever, they all want to go to those places.” [IC, interview 
9.02.2013, Cairo]
The above illustrates that the passport is not only a document but is 
associated with economic resources. The good life IC refers to is a 
situation in which one can make a living. For instance, in Cairo, the 
“big” passport gives access to particular privileges such as employ-
ment, while Somali refugees are legally neither allowed to work61 nor 
to create their own business as it would be possible in South Africa for 
example.62 In contrast, the émigré population by carrying foreign pass-
ports, enjoys such economic privileges.
“With a Somali passport, you can’t work. So he [the youth] can’t work, 
particularly if he is Somali. But for example people from the diaspora 
who come from abroad, they have shops in the middle of the city. What 
do they have? A passport from another country. They hold an Ameri-
can, Swedish, German, or French passport. They hold big passports.” 
[Axmed, interview on 22.03.13, Cairo.]
For students, the “big” passport is also associated with the access to 
prestigious universities. Students coming from “the other abroad” 
have been trained in a way that student with a Somali passport cannot 
compete with.
Thus, acquiring a “big” passport means to stop being a refugee and 
start turning into an migrant or a person leading a “normal life.” Eco-
nomic and political vulnerability coupled with social exclusion con-
tribute to framing Cairo as a crossroad, a place where one leads a life 
as refugee. The presence of the UNHCR continues to create hopes for 
resettlement and helps refugees to cope with their vulnerable situa-
tion. Yet, it contrasts tragically with the protracted character of their 
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stay and the associated self-helplessness if that objective cannot be 
achieved—a process known as buufis.63 Buufis characterizes a hope for 
resettlement, and is associated with tragic consequences if it cannot be 
achieved.
The case of Maxamud illustrates that seeking resettlement or a citi-
zenship means escaping the status of being a refugee as well as the 
phenomenon of buufis. He spent most of his life as a refugee. He left 
Somalia as he was almost eight years old, spent ten years as a refugee 
in Libya, and then ten years in Cairo. Maxamud works now as a trans-
lator for a charity organization and compared to the vulnerable life 
of other refugees in Cairo, he has a stable situation and enjoys a good 
social status among Somali refugees to whom he is helpful, because 
he understands the “system” just as well as the lives of the refugees 
in Cairo. He speaks fluent Arabic and the Egyptian dialect, and has 
lived the last twenty years of his life abroad. He fulfills the criteria of 
“integration” commonly referred to in Western societies. He has a job, 
and has most of his family in Europe, and thus he is not living within 
the same economic and social vulnerabilities as many other refugees. 
Despite this, he still feels like a refugee, disconnected from the society 
in which he lives, due to the necessity of renewing the refugee visa fre-
quently and the anonymity in which he lives in the Egyptian metropo-
lis. Maxamud is resigned and exhausted about living with the status 
of a refugee, and failed in his own term to reach his objectives. Most of 
his opportunities for a “better life” are blocked: the “big” passport, for 
instance, seems out of reach. Local integration is not an option, because 
staying in Egypt means remaining a refugee. And the “return” is frus-
trating after such a long period of refugeehood. Life in Somalia offers 
him only a very limited perspective—because he considers himself too 
old/too mature to join any of the warring camp—and security seems 
very fragile.
Similarly, students see their conditions worsening over the years 
with only limited available options. For them, the limited opportuni-
ties, after reaching a bachelor degree, is of weighty concern. Neither 
advancing academically nor working legally is real options. Thus, it 
has become common practice to remain in Cairo, with neither social 
protection nor resources, to move somewhere else or register at the 
UNHCR.64 Buufis in this case does not only refer to the longing for 
resettlement and the frustration of failure, but more generally it refers 
to a condition and a feeling of being locked physically in a particular 
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geographical setting (Cairo) and at the same time, into a particular 
social and economic condition.
The ultimate goal is not only to move geographically or to acquire 
another citizenship per se; rather, it is to achieve a “settled” set of mind. 
Indeed, with the growing connection to Somalis worldwide, the forced 
migrants hear stories and experiences of Somalis in dibadda kale, which 
is in “the other abroad.” Social media and other sources of communi-
cation contribute to the knowledge of, sometimes very detailed, expe-
riences of Somali refugees in the “West.” For instance, Mustaf could 
describe very well the visa application procedures one goes through in 
the U.S., the lives of Somali refugees living in the global North, and the 
difficult situations some may live in. His account showed that forced 
migrants are to some extent aware that reaching the ultimate objective 
of being closer to acquiring a “big” passport is not necessarily a situa-
tion of empowerment.
“You know, some young people I know, their minds are not settled, I 
mean, they were hurt in their minds. They didn’t get what they wanted, 
and they have left their education [in Cairo]. Here [in Cairo], they were 
sitting, and now there [in the global North], and until now they are ille-
gal, so in fact they don’t have anything. So when he is there, his family 
is calling, so he switches off his mobile, and he becomes all busy. Some 
even became crazy. I see them on Facebook you know, and on YouTube, 
some videos they have done, really it makes your heart burn. You are 
shocked. You know, a young person your age, with whom you used to 
study and lead the same life. You see him croon, and talk to himself.” 
[Mustaafa, interview 26.03.2013, Cairo.]
Mustafa, who is employed by an Egyptian company sees his situation 
as more desirable than that of his friends, who have been resettled 
or found “a way” to reach western countries, because he works, can 
remit to his family, accomplish his five prayers and has the perspective 
of getting married. Yet, Mustafa is not considered diaspora, because 
his options—in terms of mobility—are circumscribed and he is at the 
mercy of his employers.
Acquiring the passport was not associated with a specific geographic 
setting; rather, it enables particular social practices through mobility. 
And those are very similar to the transnational lifestyle of émigrés. 
Faadumo works as a nanny for a Somali “émigré” family, who used to 
live in Canada. The family she works for lives in a gated community 
outside of the city. It is composed of the woman/mother, Raxma and 
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her three children, who attend a private school. Her husband lives in 
Canada with two older daughters and other relatives. Raxma settled 
in Cairo to be physically closer to Somalia, where her parents live, but 
also because she plans to settle in Somalia. She was investing in the 
building of a school where she intends to teach. She has been trained 
as an English teacher in Canada, but could not find a job. She travels 
regularly between Cairo and Mogadishu. Faadumo lives with them, 
cleans and cooks for five to six days a week when Raxma is around, 
and for longer periods when she is away. Moreover, Raxma and her 
children go to Canada for summer vacations sometimes, the husband 
and other siblings also come to visit in Egypt, but Raxma returns to 
Canada for health services, especially when she was pregnant. In the 
end, she came back to Cairo with the younger children and the new-
born. To explain the reason why she wants to acquire a passport in the 
global North, Faadumo explained:
“I want to go to the USA or Europe, get a passport, work there and go 
back to my mother. Even if I have children, I get married, I will take my 
children and stay with my mother [in Somalia]. I will go give birth there 
[in the USA or Europe], and go back to Somalia. Even if my husband 
doesn’t want to go to Somalia, it is fine. He will only support his chil-
dren, that is also what they want Somali men. Supporting in Somalia 
doesn’t need much money. So I will go there.” [Faadumo, interview 
15.02.2013, Cairo]
The phenomenon Faadumo describes is closely related to her own 
experience in the family she works for as a nanny. Moreover, she also 
describes the structure of families, who tend to live in different geo-
graphical settings, which involves frequent visits. As such, the pass-
port with all the meaning it carries as described above, is in the end a 
guarantee that one can live what was termed as a “normal life,” that 
is a “settled” state condition in which one enjoys free mobility and 
the possibility to make a living associated with economic and social 
resources.
The distinction I have elaborated on so far is central in the politics 
of recognition of forced migrants. As noted earlier, the concept of dias-
pora should be situated in a process of recognition and claim making, 
which involves what Kleist called “flexible politics of belonging.”65 
The latter refers to strategies of actors such as government officials or 
migrants themselves mobilizing a particular “diasporic identity” in 
relation to particular political claims.66 I suggest below illustrating that 
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disclaiming of the category of diaspora allows forced migrants to for-
mulate particular claims to state officials.
The formation of the latest Somali government in 2012 has been 
seen as an important event for Somali forced migrants in Cairo. On 
his diplomatic rounds, the Somali president Hassan Sheikh Mahamud 
visited Somalis living in Cairo on the 8th of February 2013. The visit of 
delegation of Somali state officials in Cairo has evoked a strong feeling 
of hope, associated with the perspective of improving their life condi-
tion:
“The new government is now our biggest hope. You could even notice, 
the students who were sleeping would stand up and say ‘the country is 
doing better, I will find a job!’ You know the diplomas, there has to be a 
job associated to it!” [Maxamed, interview on 01.04.2013]
Moreover, groups of forced migrants have also gathered along the del-
egation route to formulate claims to address the Egyptian government 
through Somali officials. These included the re-negotiation of scholar-
ships for student, the possibility to extent the academic education in 
including a master degree, or to work legally.
The Somali government and its officials are of vital importance 
to forced migrants because it means the establishment of a political 
authority, which they can address as citizens:
“I am part of the people [of Somalia], the right of my country is that 
I study, I mean that I invest the good things in my country. Be it my 
time, my knowledge, tell people around me about it, everything I can 
do, be good for my home, be a good mother, be good to my neighbors, 
and bring people to think my country is good. I also have rights in 
my country [Somalia], among these is that I can live in my country, be 
relaxed there, and find what I need there.” [Sacdiya, Interview 02.04. 
2013, Cairo]
There is the idea that this relationship is based on reciprocity, where 
forced migrants as citizens do what is in their power (to study, to invest 
their time and their knowledge, to be a good mother etc.), while the 
state should create a peaceful environment (“be relaxed”) and enable 
the conditions for a decent living (“find what I need”), which include 
education and employment mainly.
The Somali president’s speech was pervaded by a mobilizing dis-
course: rebuilding Somalia is associated with shared efforts of “all 
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Somalis” including those who are abroad. It involved further a “return” 
with the promise that security measures would be enforced. The dis-
course of forced migrants, as a response to the diplomatic mission, 
was one which emphasized their precarious life conditions. In fact, as 
forced migrants, it has been emphasized that they need to “help them-
selves” first and then, “help the country.” The role of the Somali state 
remains to create a setting viable for return given their own limited 
mobility.
In forced migrants discourse as well, rebuilding Somalia is con-
ceived as the task of “all Somalis” regardless of their citizenship, yet 
with differentiated obligations. The quote of Sacdiya above illustrates 
well the obligation of forced migrants: “doing what is in their power,” 
that is with their limited resources. In contrast, Somali Westerners are 
perceived as being the first who should return to Somalia, because they 
can leave again easily, in comparison to forced migrants. For instance, 
Faamo Xuseen is an elderly woman, and when I met her, we watched 
Somali TV channels which portray Mogadishu and Somalia as a vast 
field under construction. However, Faamo remained doubtful:
“They say Somalia is safe, there are hotels being built here and there. 
Everywhere construction is going on. But there is still fear. I mean peo-
ple living in Europe and these other places, why didn’t they go back? 
Everyone wants to go back. But nobody is going. If there was security, 
there would have been people going back.” [Faamo Xusseen, interview 
07. 03. 2013]
What the quote of Faamo illustrates is the role of Somali westerners, 
who are here seen as indicators of the degree of security in Somalia. As 
long as a degree of security and livelihood are not achieved in Soma-
lia, the discourse of “everybody returns” is mainly directed towards 
Somalis in the global North. In contrast to forced migrants, the émigrés 
have acquired the “big” passport and the associated resources and 
mobility. Their return is also considered obvious, because “they are 
Somali,” and their role in Somalia is to some extent similar to their role 
in Cairo as described earlier: invest their economic capital to live their 
lives in Somalia and employ their fellow Somalis.
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IV. Conclusion
This paper identifies some of the ways in which forced migrants reject 
the universalist discourse of the ‘diaspora.’ The accounts of Somali 
forced migrants in Cairo illustrate how particular migrants come 
to position themselves towards the ‘diaspora.’ In this article, I have 
described how some Somali forced migrants live in Cairo. It is a situa-
tion marked by economic, social and political vulnerabilities, while the 
networks of which they are a part provide them with meager resources 
to survive. In this regard, the Somali émigrés living in Cairo are 
important social capital. They are seen as the antithesis of the Somali 
forced migrants: while both share a belonging to Somalia as a common 
‘homeland,’ acquiring the passport of a country in the global North has 
been described as the symbol granting political protection, economic 
resources and social status. Moreover, disclaiming the category of dias-
pora enables forced migrants to distance themselves from dominant 
public uses of the concept of “diaspora” and expectations associated 
with it. Because of their vulnerable circumstances, they position them-
selves outside the diaspora—a self-identification that puts them in a 
different relationship with the Somali state. This allows them to create 
a space in which they can articulate their own demands and needs. 
These involved both the negotiation of a return to Somalia under the 
conditions of security and livelihood, as well as the improvement of 
their legal status in Egypt.
In this regard, the concept of diaspora provides a theoretical frame-
work to understand the process of diaspora formation, as conflicting 
projects rather than a given fixed category. Moreover, it seems neces-
sary to see it not as an autonomous category outside of a social setting; 
instead, these conflicting interests contribute to root ‘diaspora’ in a spe-
cific context.67 Indeed, from the perspective of Somali forced migrants 
in Cairo, there is no ‘diaspora’ outside the Global North. This formula-
tion can be of great relevance to recent efforts to assess the role of the 
diaspora as agents of social change, and more particularly in relation 
to the rise of what Van Hear has named the “refugee diaspora.”68 In 
fact, the accounts of Somali forced migrants living in Cairo illustrate 
the struggles of urban forced migrants to make a place for themselves 
in the world. The paper, then, contributes to the growing efforts of 
local integration as a meaningful solution to protracted displacement. 
This is especially noteworthy given the fact that contemporary migra-
tion is increasingly being characterized as also a South-South real-
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ity.69 Furthermore, as Bradley suggests, the struggle can also be about 
regaining a place in the world, which involves a return on negotiated 
terms.70 Returning, from the perspective of Somali forced migrants in 
Cairo, should be possible to a place where one can lead what many 
termed a “normal life.” Considering such accounts is of relevance in 
post-conflict settings, where the question of livelihood is of crucial 
importance.71
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